Fact-checking is a journalistic practice that seeks to hold politicians accountable for the accuracy of their public statements. Studies have found that fact-checks of individual statements do not always have the expected e ect on people's beliefs or opinions, but little is known about the e ects of summary fact-checking, which assesses the accuracy of politicians over time. In a series of experimental studies, we compare the e ects of negative individual statement ratings and summary fact-checking data on perceptions of two prominent elected o cials and the accuracy of the statements they make. As predicted, summary fact-checking had a greater e ect on perceptions of politicians' favorability and statement accuracy than fact-checking of individual statements. However, we did not observe the expected pattern of motivated reasoning; co-partisans were not consistently more resistant than were supporters of the opposition party.
Fact-checking websites have changed how media outlets cover politics. Sites like PolitiFact, FactCheck.org, and the Washington Post Fact Checker seek to correct misinformation and hold politicians accountable by providing extensive coverage of the accuracy of claims made by political figures. Nevertheless, inaccurate claims continue to mar political debate and distort public opinion. Evidence of fact-checking's influence on people's beliefs and opinions is mixed (compare, e.g., Kuklinski et al. 2000 and Fridkin, Kenney, and Wintersieck 2015) . In particular, we know very little about the e ects of the increasingly prominent summary fact-check format, which aggregates fact-check ratings for politicians.
In this study, we compare the e ects of summary fact-checking data and individual fact-check ratings on views of politicians who make misleading claims. Consistent with our preregistered hypotheses, summary fact-checking data reduces perceptions of politicians' accuracy and favorability more than exposure to a negative individual fact-check rating does. These e ects are not consistently moderated by other factors such as partisanship, political knowledge, or education. These results demonstrate that fact-checking -especially when presented in a summary format -can play an important role in holding politicians accountable for misleading statements.
Theory
The existing literature o ers mixed conclusions about the e ects of fact-checks and other corrective information on both factual beliefs and candidate perceptions. Several studies indicate that factchecks of individual statements can correct misinformation, increase political knowledge, and a ect voter behavior (e.g., Gottfried et al. 2013; Fridkin, Kenney, and Wintersieck 2015) , but others find that fact-checks may have limited e ects or be counterproductive (e.g., Garrett and Weeks 2013; Garrett, Nisbet, and Lynch 2013) . One reason is that people often resist information that runs counter to their partisan or ideological views (e.g., Taber and Lodge 2006).
Scholars have yet to examine the e ects of summary fact-checking data, which media outlets increasingly provide to help readers di erentiate between candidates who have made a single false statement and those with long histories of spreading misinformation. Outlets frequently compile multiple ratings of a given politician on scales such as PolitiFact's Truth-o-Meter or the Washington Post's Pinocchios scale. Because these data better convey a pattern of deception than do individual fact-check ratings, they may be more likely to cause voters to update their views of a candidate via a memory-based "running tally" (e.g., Fiorina 1981) or an a ective online processing model (e.g., Lodge and Taber 2005) . 1 To date, most studies have focused on how fact-checks a ect belief accuracy. However, summary fact-checking does not attempt to correct specific false or misleading claims. We therefore do not assess its e ects on factual beliefs in this article but instead compare the e ects of summary fact-checking and individual fact-check ratings on perceptions of politicians.
We proposed three preregistered hypotheses and two research questions. First, drawing on the experimental literature supporting the e cacy of fact-checks, we predicted that individuals exposed to negative fact-checking of a politician in either format would view that politician less favorably and perceive them as less accurate (H1). We also predicted that summary fact-checking data would have a larger e ect on these outcome variables than an individual fact-checking rating (H2). Finally, per theories of motivated reasoning (e.g., Kunda 1990; Taber and Lodge 2006) we predicted that the favorability and perceived accuracy of politicians would decrease more when individuals viewed fact-checking of the opposition party compared to their own (H3).
In addition, we propose two related research questions, asking whether participants' political knowledge or level of education would moderate the e ects of fact-checking (RQ1) and whether prior fact-checking exposure would a ects attitudes toward fact-checking (RQ2). Existing evidence is limited on both points. Fact-checking may be more e ective among the politically knowledgeable (Fridkin, Kenney, and Wintersieck 2015) , but they may also be more skilled at resisting corrective information (Taber and Lodge 2006) . No published studies examine the e ects of fact-checking on attitudes toward the practice. 1 Concerns about selection bias and subjectivity still apply, however -see, e.g., Uscinski and Butler (2013) .
Methods
Prior to conducting the study, we preregistered the design, hypotheses, and analysis plan in the EGAP archive. 2 The sample consists of 2,825 participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online marketplace frequently used to recruit research participants (e.g., Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012) . 3 Data collection took place from May 7-10, 2016. Participants were required to be United States residents age 18 or older with at least a 95% HIT ("Human Intelligence Task") approval rating on Mechanical Turk.
Demographically, our sample mirrors other Mechanical Turk studies in being younger and more liberal, educated, and white than the general U.S. population. Of our sample, 50% identified as male; 55% were college graduates (our measure of educational attainment); and 82% identified as white. The median age group was 25-34. Politically, 61% identified as Democrats or Democratleaning, 28% as Republicans or Republican-leaning, and 11% as independents or something else.
Experimental design
Our study used a 3x2 between-subjects design that randomly varied fact-check type and politician partisanship. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three treatments: an individual factcheck rating of a statement about job creation, a summary fact-check rating, or the control condition.
Fact-checks used in all three studies were unfavorable (or "negative") in that they indicate a lack of truthfulness of the selected politicians and statements. Participants were also randomly assigned to a target politician: Mitch McConnell (R-KY), the Senate Majority Leader, or Harry Reid (D-NV), the Senate Minority Leader. McConnell and Reid were chosen because they belong to di erent parties but are comparable figures (white men with similar approval ratings who served as Senate Majority Leader).
2
Preregistration URL omitted for review. Deviations from the preregistered study plan are noted below. 3 An additional 719 respondents were excluded because they participated in a pilot study or did not consent to participate. Respondents were randomly assigned to see one of the four fact-checking treatments portrayed here or to a control condition. See Online Appendix A for question wording and stimulus materials.
The graphics in our individual fact-check rating treatment were adapted from PolitiFact's "Truth-O-Meter"; both senators were presented as making the same false claim. Participants in the summary fact-checking data condition were presented with a graphic adapted from The New York Times (Holan 2015) presenting either McConnell or Reid as making more false statements than the average senator. Figure 1 presents the graphics used for respondents in the treatment conditions. 4
Finally, participants in the control group were shown a graphic displaying predicted weather for Des Moines, Iowa. We included a caption for each graphic to ensure that participants understood the information presented and to match the format and design of the stimuli between conditions as closely as possible (see Online Appendix A).
4
See Online Appendix A for the full survey instrument and stimulus materials, including the graphic used in the control conditions. The treatment graphics were designed to resemble real-world stimuli as closely as possible (see Online Appendix C for examples).
Procedure
Participants were first required to provide informed consent and their age. They then answered questions regarding their demographics, party a liation, and political knowledge before the experimental manipulation. 5 After a brief task intended to conceal the study's purpose, participants answered questions measuring three outcome variables: favorability towards McConnell or Reid, perceived accuracy of that senator, and favorability towards fact-checking (see Online Appendix A for full survey text). 6 Participants were then debriefed and compensated for their time.
Measures
Our study measured two primary outcome variables on five-point scales: how often statements made by the senator are accurate from "never" (1) to "all of the time" (5) and how favorable or unfavorable their views of the senator are from "very unfavorable" (1) to "very favorable" (5). For our second research question, we asked four questions about participants' perceptions of fact-checking (see Online Appendix A for details).
We also consider several pre-treatment moderators. For H3, we classify participants' party allegiance by which political party they identify with or lean towards. To explore RQ1, we measured the education level and political knowledge of participants. We asked them to report their level of education and classified those with a bachelor's degree or above as having a high level of education.
We assessed political knowledge on a standard five-question scale.Those who answered 4 or 5 of the questions correctly (about 49% of respondents) were classified as high political knowledge in a median split.
5
Demographic and knowledge characteristics did not vary significantly between our three experimental groups (see Table C1 in Online Appendix C).
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Respondents were also asked about their perceptions of the other senator to whom they were not assigned, but we exclude those responses from all analyses below because of the possibility of a contrast e ect.
Results
We analyzed the e ects of our experiment using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors. 7
Main e ects of fact-check type
Consistent with our first preregistered hypothesis (H1), exposure to either negative summary factchecking data or a negative individual fact-check rating led to significantly lower accuracy and favorability ratings than the control condition. These findings hold for both outcome measures and both target politicians (see Table 1 ). Consistent with H1, respondents provided with an individual fact-check rating (b =-0.16, SE=0.05) or summary fact-checking data (b =-0.32, SE=0.05) about McConnell rated the accuracy of his statements lower than those in the control condition.
Results were substantively identical for those exposed to an individual fact-check rating (b =-0.22, SE=0.06) or summary fact-check data (b =-0.65, SE=0.05) about Reid. Results were identical for favorability ratings. When asked about McConnell's favorability, the individual fact-check rating (b =-0.28, SE=0.06) and summary fact-checking data (b =-0.59, SE=0.06) groups rated him lower than the control group; the individual (b =-0.20, SE=0.06) and summary (b =-0.62, SE=0.06) groups assigned to Reid did the same.
Our second preregistered hypothesis (H2) predicted that the summary fact-checking data group would rate politicians lower than those exposed to negative individual fact-check ratings. The results correspond directly with our hypothesis: the summary fact-checking data group rated McConnell lower on accuracy (b =-0.17, SE=0.05) and favorability (b =-0.31, SE=0.06) than did the individual fact-check rating group. Similarly, respondents assigned to unfavorable summary factchecking data about Reid rated him lower on accuracy (b =-0.44, SE=0.05) and favorability (b =-0.43, SE=0.06) than did those who saw a rating of an individual statement by Reid. Figure 2 illustrates the substantive magnitude of these e ects. As displayed in Figure 2a , control 7 Equivalent ordered probit models are provided in Online Appendix C for all OLS models in the main text. Per our preregistration, we analyze the results separately by candidate rather than pooling because we reject the null of no di erence in treatment e ects by fact-checking target (i.e., politician) for at least one outcome variable in each study. 
Party interactions
To capture the partisan e ects predicted by our third hypothesis (H3), we report statistical models that allow for di erences in treatment e ects by partisan group in Table 2 . However, these models did not produce clear evidence of a directionally motivated response to negative fact-checking information. For instance, the negative e ect of summary fact-checking data on perceptions of Reid's accuracy was greater among Democrats than among both independents (b =-0.54, SE=0.15) Means by condition (control, individual fact-check rating, or summary fact-checking data); see Online Appendix A for question wording and stimulus materials. and Republicans (b =-0.25, SE=0.11).We therefore do not discuss H3 further.
Research questions
Our first research question asked whether political knowledge or education would moderate treatment e ects overall or among partisans, but our findings did not yield consistent results. Both fact-check types reduced McConnell favorability ratings more among people with low knowledge than among those with high knowledge. However, summary fact-checking data reduced Reid accuracy ratings more among respondents with high knowledge. Our findings are thus inconclusive.
For our education results, we compared participants with and without a bachelor's degree. We find only one significant di erence in fact-check e ects by education. Thus, we cannot conclude that education a ects participants' responses toward fact-checks of either type. 8 Similarly, factchecking exposure had no measurable e ect on perceptions of fact-checking for the four outcome measures we examined: favorability toward fact-checking, demand for more fact-checking, and the perceived accuracy and fairness of fact-checking. 9 See Online Appendix C for full results from these models. (We obtain similar results when we interact our treatments with measures of political knowledge and education -see Online Appendix C. We therefore do not discuss our research questions further.)
Discussion
The results of this study confirm that summary fact-checking was more e ective at influencing individuals' perceived accuracy and favorability of selected politicians than were individual factcheck ratings. These results did not vary by party or other preregistered moderators.
The design we employed has two principal limitations. First, the summary fact-check we tested also includes fact-check information for an average senator. However, we provide results in Online Appendix B from two additional studies showing that our results are substantively identical when we omit this comparison from the summary fact-check. Second, summary fact-checks explicitly lay out the politician's record of accuracy, while an individual fact-check is centered around a single statement. Asking about overall accuracy might result in participants repeating back what they saw in the summary, rather than acting on an updated belief. In the studies reported in Online Appendix B, we corrected for this by changing the wording of our dependent variable and again find similar results.
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See Online Appendix C for the results of these simple exploratory models as well as our preregistered analyses, which instead interact the treatments with both partisan indicators as well as linear or tercile measures of education or knowledge.
Conclusion
Summary fact-checking data has significantly greater e ects on perceptions of political figures than fact-check ratings of an individual statement. Compared to respondents who see an unfavorable or negative fact-check rating of a single statement, those who see unfavorable summary fact-checking data view the politicians in question less favorably and perceive statements they make as less accurate. These e ects are not consistently moderated by other factors, including partisan a liation, political knowledge, or education.
These results suggest that news organizations should use summary fact-checking to encourage responsible conduct by political figures. However, caution is still required. Fact-checking individual statements is still the best way to set the record straight about a specific claim. Moreover, reporters and editors must consider whether aggregated fact-checks accurately represent a political figure's overall record or will leave a distorted impression (Uscinski and Butler 2013).
Future research should consider other research questions and approaches we did not evaluate.
First, it would be valuable to test fact-checks of non-quantitative claims as well as di erent stimulus graphics or ratings. Additional studies could also consider more controversial targets or issues; vary the source of fact-checks; or test the e ects of positive fact-checks. Second, we did not directly assess factual beliefs about a specific statement. Third, it would be worthwhile to further investigate the mechanisms for this e ect (a di cult question under any circumstances).
Still, these results are an important first step in testing the e ects of this new format, which we find has greater e ects on perceptions of politicians than does an individual fact-check rating. By increasing the reputational risk of making false claims in this way, summary fact-checking may help to discourage politicians from promoting misinformation in the first place. Online Appendix A [Consent] This study is being conducted by (omitted for peer review). We ask for your attention for a few minutes and we thank you for your attention and your responses. Your participation is voluntary and you may decline the interview or withdraw at any time. No information that identifies you will be collected or retained by the researchers. However, any online interaction carries some risk of being accessed. Thinking about the amount of fact-checking that you see being performed today by journalists, do you think there should be more fact-checking, the current amount of fact-checking is about right, or there should be less fact-checking? -There should be more fact-checking ( In presenting the news dealing with political and social issues, do you think fact-checkers deal fairly with all sides or tend to favor one side? -Fact-checkers tend to deal fairly with all sides (1) -Fact-checkers tend to favor one side (0) In general, would you say fact-checkers tend to be liberal, neutral, or conservative? -Liberal -Neutral -Conservative
[Debriefing]
Thank you for answering these questions. The purpose of this study was not to assess whether people find text or graphics more informative, but rather to examine the e ects of how political facts are presented. During this survey, participants were asked a series of questions about general information and their political opinions. Before answering these questions, some participants viewed di erent presentations of results from political fact-checks. These fact-check results were fabricated by the researchers for the purposes of the experiment. Thank you again for your participation. Please do not share any information about the nature of this study with other potential participants. This research is not intended to support or oppose any political candidate or o ce. The research has no a liation with any political candidate or campaign and has received no financial support from any political candidate or campaign. Should you have any questions about this study, please contact (omitted for peer review).
It is essential for the validity of this study that we know whether participants looked up any information online during the study. Did you make an e ort to look up information during the study? Please be honest; you will not be penalized in any way if you did.
-Yes, I looked up information -No, I did not look up information Do you have any comments on the survey? Please let us know about any problems you had or aspects of the survey that were confusing.
[
text box]
Online Appendix B
Study 2
Study 2 replicated Study 1 (the study in the main text) with the exception of two changes. First, in addition to measuring participant perceptions of the accuracy and favorability of Senators Reid and McConnell, we included a new question that tested participants' perceived accuracy of a new statement putatively made by the senator about whom they saw a fact-check ("Kentucky/Nevada has more private sector jobs than ever before"). This measure allows us to discern whether participants are actively updating beliefs or merely reporting what they saw in the fact-check graphics. Second, we altered the summary fact-check graphic to remove the comparison to an average senator:
This change allows us to determine whether the aggregate or comparative aspects of the summary fact-check caused the stronger e ects of summary fact-checks on participant perceptions. (No changes were made to the individual fact-check rating treatment.) The study was conducted November 4-8, 2016. The sample (N=2823) was demographically very similar to that of Study 1 (49% male, 52% college graduates, 80% white; median age group 25-34; 59% Democrat (with leaners), 30% Republican (with leaners), and 11% independent or something else). Criteria and payment were identical to those of Study 1. The design, hypotheses, and analysis approach of Study 2 were again preregistered at EGAP. Respondents who had taken part in Study 1 were excluded.
Results
Study 2 results were similar to Study 1 for the two existing outcome measures. As in Study 1, respondents perceived the general accuracy of statements made by McConnell and Reid as lower when exposed to summary fact-checking versus an individual fact-check rating (-.11, p < .05 for McConnell, -.43, p < .01 for Reid). We again find that favorability toward the target politician was reduced more by summary fact-checking information versus a fact-check of an individual statement, though the results were not statistically significant for McConnell (-.09, p < .20 for McConnell; -.36, p < .01 for Reid). However, our fact-checking manipulation did not have the anticipated e ect on our new outcome measure, an accuracy rating of a new statement by the target politician. Participants shown a fact-check of an individual statement by McConnell (b =-0.42, SE=0.04) actually rated the new statement about more jobs being created as significantly less accurate than those shown summary fact-checking data (b =-0.32, SE=0.04; di erence = 0.10, p < .05). In addition, the di erence in the accuracy rating of the new statement by Reid was null for participants shown an individual fact-checking rating (b =-0.33, SE=0.04) and those shown summary fact-checking data (b =-0.35, SE=0.04).
Discussion
Study 2 largely replicated the results of Study 1. Summary fact-checking information typically had more negative e ects on the perceived accuracy of a politician and favorability toward that figure than an individual fact-check rating. However, we found an anomalous result in how respondents evaluated the accuracy of a new statement attributed to the politician in question. This di erence in accuracy rating may have been the result of an inadvertent confound in the topics between the individual fact-check rating (job creation during their tenure as Majority Leader) and the statement participants rated afterward (private sector jobs in their state). We therefore replicate our findings again in Study 3 below using a design that removes this confound.
Study 3
Study 3 corrected a confound in the design of Study 2. Due to concerns about the close conceptual relationship between the topic for the fact-check of an individual statement (job creation) and the topic of the new statement whose accuracy respondents were asked to assess in Study 2 (private sector jobs), respondents were instead asked in Study 3 to evaluate the accuracy of the following statement from either McConnell or Reid: "I haven't switched my position on the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal."
Study 3 was also preregistered with EGAP and is identical to Study 2 except for the wording of the outcome measure described above. It was conducted January 12-16, 2017. The sample was very similar to the previous studies (n = 2, 845: 47% male, 53% college graduates, 80% white; median age group 25-34; 57% Democrats (with leaners), 31% Republicans (with leaners), and 12% independents or something else). Respondents who had taken part in Studies 1 and 2 were excluded.
Results
Study 3 replicated the findings in Studies 1 and 2. The perceived accuracy of statements made by McConnell and Reid and favorability toward them were lower when respondents were shown summary fact-checking data compared to an individual fact-check rating (p < .01 in each case). Most notably, when the topic confound in Study 2 was removed from the novel statement, participants shown summary fact-checking data on McConnell (b =-0.37, SE=0.05) rated the new statement as less accurate than those shown an individual fact-check rating of McConnell (b =-0.17, SE=0.05; di erence = -0.20, p < .01). Those shown summary fact-checking data on Reid (b =-0.46, SE=0.05) also rated the additional statement as less accurate than participants shown an individual fact-checking rating of McConnell (b =-0.24, SE=0.05; di erence = -0.22, p < .01).
Discussion
The results of Study 3 help explain the unexpected finding in Study 2, where participants who saw an individual fact-check rating viewed a new statement by that politician as less accurate than those who saw summary fact-checking information. We hypothesized that this finding was the result of the topic of the fact-check graphic and the novel statement being closely aligned. Study 3 showed that we found the expected relationship when examining accuracy evaluations of a novel statement on a di erent topic unrelated to the fact-check of an individual statement. In this case, participants who were shown summary fact-checking data rated the novel statement as less accurate than those who were shown an individual fact-checking rating. * p < 0.05, ** p < .01 (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. All di erences between summary and individual conditions are insignificant (available upon request). * p < 0.05, ** p < .01 (two-sided). Ordered probit models with robust standard errors (cutpoints omitted). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. 
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